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Expectational Coordination in a class of Economic Models :
Strategic Substitutabilities versus Strategic
Complementarities ∗
Roger Guesnerie† Pedro Jara-Moroni‡
Abstract
We consider an economic model that features : 1. a continuum of agents 2. an aggre-
gate state of the world over which agents have an infinitesimal influence. We first propose
a review, based on work by Jara-Moroni (2007), of the connections between the eductive
viewpoint that puts emphasis on Strongly Rational Expectations equilibrium and the stan-
dard game-theoretical rationalizability concepts. We explore the scope and limits of this
connection depending on whether standard rationalizability versus point-rationalizability, or
the local versus the global viewpoint, are concerned. In particular, we define and characterize
the set of Point-Rationalizable States and prove its convexity. Also, we clarify the role of
the heterogeneity of beliefs in general contexts of expectational coordination (see Evans and
Guesnerie (2005)). Then, as in the case of strategic complementarities the study of some
best response mapping is a key to the analysis, in the case of unambiguous strategic sub-
stitutabilities the study of some second iterate, and of the corresponding two-period cycles,
allows to describe the point-rationalizable states. We provide application in microeconomic
and macroeconomic contexts.
1 Introduction
Our purpose in this paper is then twofold.
First, we attempt to bring in a similar light, the standard game theoretical viewpoint of coordi-
nation on rationalizable solutions and the related viewpoint adopted in the study of expectational
coordination in economic contexts, as for example in Guesnerie (1992, 2002), Evans and Guesnerie
(1993, 2003, 2005). In this work, as well as in most related work on expectational coordination
in economic contexts, (Morris and Shin (1998), Chamley (1999, 2004)) as well as in the theory
of crisis, economic agents are non-atomic, in the sense that they are too small to have a signif-
icant influence on the economic system, and the eductive reasoning that governs the evaluation
of expectational stability refers to game-theoretical rationalizability ideas. Our aim of linking the
“economic” and the “game-theoretical” views brings us to adopt the framework of a game with
a continuum of agents and aggregators in the sense used by Rath (1992). Relying in particular
on Jara-Moroni (2007), we show the precise connections between the game-theoretical concepts
of rationalizability, point-rationalizability and the economic concepts of eductive stability. We
stress the convexity properties of the different sets of rationalizable outcomes that follow, in the
continuum game, from Liapounov like theorems. We establish the connections between the con-
cepts of IE-Stability, the different concepts of Strong Rationality as well as between their local
counterparts that allow to select locally eductively stable equilibria.
∗We would like to thank our discussant at the Conference on Complementarities and Information, Bruno
Strulovici for helpful observations.
†PSE - E´cole des Hautes E´tudes en Sciences Sociales and Colle`ge de France
‡PSE - E´cole des Hautes E´tudes en Sciences Sociales and DIM - Universidad de Chile
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Second, relying on this framework, we focus attention on two classes of economic problems. In
the first one, aggregate strategic complementarities, we reassess and strengthen well known game-
theoretical results concerning equilibria and rationalizable solutions. The second class of models
has, on the contrary, aggregate strategic substitutabilities. All expectational properties obtained
in the strategic complementarity case are shown to have counterparts here. In particular, the set
of Rationalizable states is precisely located from cycles of order 2 associated with the system.
With differentiability assumptions we get stronger results and simple sufficient conditions assur-
ing the existence of a global Strongly Rational Expectations or a unique rationalizable solution.
Applications are given for example using the general equilibrium model of Guesnerie (2001a).
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we introduce games with a continuum of players
and we relate it to a class of economic models with a continuum of agents. We show how this
setting may be viewed from a game theoretical point of view and we introduce the concepts
of Economic equilibrium and Nash Equilibrium. In section 3 we formulate Rationalizability in
this context. We introduce first the concepts of Point-Rationalizable Strategies. We present an
economic version of Rationalizability introducing Point-Rationalizable States and Rationalizable
States and we relate these concepts to the game theoretical ones. In section 4 we address the
economic concepts of Iterative Expectational Stability and Eductive Stability using the tools
defined in section 3. Then in Section 5 we successively focus attention on aggregate models with
Strategic Complementarities or Strategic Substitutabilities. Our general results here are tightened
when we examine the differentiable version of the model. In Section 7 we conclude.
2 The canonical model and concepts.
This Section aims at making a careful connection between the underlying game theoretical concepts
and the economic application which they are solicited for. We present first a game theoretical
framework that underlies the standard economic model with a continuum of agents, presented
afterwards. We then introduce and compare the parallel tools used for the analysis.
2.1 Games with a continuum of players
We consider a game with a continuum of players. Non atomic games with continuum of players
where first introduced by Schmeidler (1973). In these games the set of players is the measure
space (I, I, λ), where I is the unit interval of R, I ≡ [0, 1], and λ is the lebesgue measure. Each
player chooses a strategy s(i) ∈ S(i) and we take S(i) ⊆ Rn. Strategy profiles in this setting are
identified with integrable selections1 of the set valued2 mapping i ⇒ S(i). For simplicity, we will
assume that all the players have the same compact strategy set S(i) ≡ S ⊂ Rn+. As a consequence,
since S is compact, the set of meaningful strategy profiles is the set of measurable functions from
I to S 3 noted from now on SI .
In a game, players have payoff functions that depend on their own strategy and the complete
profile of strategies of the player pi(i, · , · ) : S × SI → R. In our particular framework these
functions depend, for each player, on his own strategy and an average of the strategies of all the
other players. To obtain this average we use the integral of the strategy profile,
∫
I
s(i) di. This
implies that all the relevant information about the actions of the opponents is summarized by the
values of the integrals, which are points in the set 4
A ≡
∫
I
S(i) di.
1A selection is a function s : I → Rn such that s(i) ∈ S(i).
2We use the notation ⇒ for set valued mappings (also referred to as correspondences), and → for functions.
3Equivalently, the set of measurable selections of the constant set valued mapping i ⇒ S.
4Following Aumann (1965) we define for a correspondence F : I ⇒ Rn its’ integral, ∫I F (i) di, as:∫
I
F (i) di :=
{
x ∈ Rn : x =
∫
I
f(i) di and f is an integrable selection of F
}
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Hypothesis over the correspondence i ⇒ S(i) that assure that the set A is well defined can be
found in Aumann (1965) or in Chapter 14 of Rockafellar and Wets (1998). In this case we get
that A is a convex set (Aumann 1965). Moreover, since S(i) ≡ S we have that 5
A ≡ co {S} . (2.1)
Pay-offs pi(i, · , · ) in this setting are evaluated from an auxiliary utility function u(i, · , · ) :
S × co {S} → R such that:
pi(i, y, s) ≡ u
(
i, y,
∫
I
s(i) di
)
(2.2)
We assume:
C : For all agent i ∈ I, u(i, · , · ) is continuous.
HM : The mapping that associates to each agent a utility function 6 is measurable.
C is standard and does not deserve special comments. HM is technical but in a sense natural
in this setting. Adopting both assumptions on utility functions put us in the framework of Rath
(1992). We begin by giving a definition of Nash Equilibrium in this setting.
Definition 2.1. A (pure strategy) Nash Equilibrium of a game is a strategy profile s∗ ∈ SI such
that:
∀ y ∈ S, u
(
i, s∗(i) ,
∫
s∗(i) di
)
≥ u
(
i, y,
∫
s∗(i) di
)
, ∀ i ∈ I λ-a.e. (2.3)
It is useful to use the best reply correspondence Br(i, · ) : SI ⇒ S defined as:
Br(i, s) := argmaxy∈S pi(i, y, s) . (2.4)
The correspondence Br(i, · ) describes the optimal response set for player i ∈ I facing a strategy
profile s.
In our setting, and considering the auxiliary function u(i, · , · ), we can define as well the
optimal strategy correspondence B(i, · ) : A ⇒ S as the correspondence which associates to each
point a ∈ A the set:
B(i, a) := argmaxy∈S {u(i, y, a)} . (2.5)
Since, in this setting, a =
∫
I
s(i) di, then Br(i, s) = B(i, a), it follows that a Nash equilibrium
is a strategy profile s∗ ∈ SI such that, ∀ i ∈ I λ-a.e., s∗(i) ∈ Br(i, s∗), or equivalently, s∗(i) ∈
B
(
i,
∫
s∗(i) di
)
(see Proposition 2.4 below).
Under the previously mentioned hypothesis Rath shows that for every such game there exists
a Nash Equilibrium.
Theorem 2.2 (Rath 1992). The above game has a (pure strategy) Nash Equilibrium.
The proof of the Theorem is based on the Kakutani fixed point Theorem applied to what we
call later the Cobweb Mapping, defined in (3.3). Indeed, a fixed point of such a correspondence
determines an equilibrium of the game (see Proposition 2.4 below as well).
5Where co {X} stands for the convex hull of a set X (see Rath (1992)).
6The set of functions for assumption HM is the set of real valued continuous functions defined on S × co {S}
endowed with the sup norm topology.
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2.2 Economic System with a continuum of agents
We address now a class of stylized economic models in which there is a large number of small
agents i ∈ I. In this economic system, there is an aggregate variable or signal that represents
the state of the system. We call A ⊆ RK the set of all possible states of the economic system.
Interaction of agents occurs through an aggregation operator, A, that to each strategy profile s
associates a state of the model a = A(s) in the set of states A. The key feature of the system is
that no agent can affect unilaterally the state of the system. That is, a change of the actions of
only one, or a small group of agents, does not modify the value of the state of the system.
These features are those captured with the non-atomic game-theoretical framework described
in the previous subsection. The so-called economic system is then naturally imbedded onto the
just defined game with a continuum of players when we use as the aggregation operator A the
integral7 of the strategy profile s:
A(s) ≡
∫
I
s(i) di.
so that the state set A is co {S} (see equation 2.1 and the comments therein). This assures that
A is a nonempty convex compact subset of Rn (i.e. K = n) (Aumann 1965).
The variable a ∈ A, that represents the state of the system, determines, along with each agents’
own action, his payoff. For each agent i ∈ I then, we use the payoff function u(i, · , · ) : S×A → R
introduced in (2.2). Agents act to maximize this payoff function.
In a situation where agents act in ignorance of the actions taken by the others or, for what
matters, of the value of the state of the system, they have to rely on forecasts. That is, their actions
must be a best response to some subjective probability distribution over the space of aggregate
data A. Mathematically, actions have to be elements of the set of points that maximize expected
utility, where the expectation is taken with respect to this subjective probability. We can consider
then the best reply to forecasts correspondence B(i, · ) : P(A) ⇒ S defined by:
B(i, µ) := argmaxy∈S Eµ [u(i, y, a)] (2.6)
where µ ∈ P(A) and P(A) is the space of probability measures over A. Since the utility functions
are continuous, problems (2.5) and (2.6) are well defined and have always a solution, so conse-
quently the mappings B(i, · ) and B(i, · ) take non-empty compact values for all a ∈ A. Clearly
B(i, a) ≡ B(i, δa), where δa is the Dirac measure concentrated in a.
An equilibrium of this system is a state a∗ generated by actions of the agents that are optimal
reactions to this state. We denote Γ(a) =
∫
I
B(i, a) di.
Definition 2.3. An equilibrium is a point a∗ ∈ A such that:
a∗ ∈ Γ(a∗) ≡
∫
I
B(i, a∗) di ≡
∫
I
B(i, δa∗) di (2.7)
Assumptions C and HM assure that the integrals in Definition 2.3 are well defined 8. The
equilibrium conditions in (2.7) are standard description of self fulfilling forecasts. That is, in an
equilibrium a∗, agents must have a self-fulfilling point forecast (Dirac measures) over a∗, i.e with
the economic terminology, a perfect foresight equilibrium (see Guesnerie (1992)).
It is unsurprising that an equilibrium as defined in (2.7) has as a counterpart in the game-
theoretical approach a Nash Equilibrium of the underlying game as defined in (2.3). Precisely
:
7The aggregation operator can as well be the integral of the strategy profile with respect to any measure λ¯ that
is absolutely continuous with respect to the lebesgue measure, or the composition of this result with a continuous
function. That is,
A(s) ≡ G
(∫
I
s(i) f(i) di
)
where G :
∫
I S(i) dλ¯(i) → A is a continuous function and f is the density of the measure λ¯ with respect to the
lebesgue measure. However not all the results in this work remain true if we choose such a setting.
8See Lemma A.1 in the appendix.
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Proposition 2.4. For every (pure strategy) Nash Equilibrium s∗ of the system’s underlying game,
there exists a unique equilibrium a∗ given by a∗ := A(s∗) and if a∗ is an equilibrium of the system,
then ∃ s∗ ∈ SI that is a Nash Equilibrium of the underlying game.
Proof. Indeed, if a∗ satisfies (2.7), then there exists an integrable strategy profile s∗ such that
s∗(i) ∈ B(i, a∗) and A(s∗) = a∗. That is s∗(i) ∈ B(i, ∫
I
s∗(i) di
)
, or equivalently
∀ y ∈ S, u
(
i, s∗(i) ,
∫
s∗(i) di
)
≥ u
(
i, y,
∫
s∗(i) di
)
, ∀ i ∈ I λ-a.e.
Conversely, if
∀ y ∈ S, u
(
i, s∗(i) ,
∫
s∗(i) di
)
≥ u
(
i, y,
∫
s∗(i) di
)
, ∀ i ∈ I λ-a.e. (2.8)
then s∗(i) ∈ Br(i, s) ≡ B(i, ∫ s∗(i) di) ∀ i ∈ I λ-a.e.. Defining a∗ := ∫
I
s∗(i) di we get that
a∗ ∈ ∫
I
B(i, a∗) di.

We will refer equivalently then, to equilibria as points a∗ ∈ A, representing economic equilibria,
and s∗ ∈ SI , as Nash Equilibria of the underlying game.
Theorem 2.5. The stylized economic model has an equilibrium.
Proof. It is the consequence of the proof of Theorem 2.2 and is related to the previous Proposition.

Example 1. Variant of Muth’s (1961) model presented in Guesnerie (1992). In this example there
is a group of farmers indexed by the unit interval. Farmers decide a positive production quantity
q(i) and get as payoff income from sales minus the cost of production: pq(i) − Ci(q(i)), where p
is the price at which the good is sold. The price is obtained from the inverse demand (or price)
function, evaluated in total aggregate production Q. We see that this model fits our framework.
We already said that the set of agents is the unit interval I = [0, 1] and we endow it with the
lebesgue measure. Strategies are production quantities, so strategy profiles are functions from the
set of agents to the positive line R+ (i.e. n = 1), q : I → R+. The aggregate variable in this
case is aggregate production. Agents can calculate their payoff by knowing aggregate production
through the price function and deciding their production. So the aggregate state space is the
positive line as well, R+ (i.e. K = 1 = n). The payoff of an agent is income from sales minus
cost of production, the utility function is then u(i, q,Q) = P (Q) q − Ci(q). Where P : R+ → R+
is an inverse demand (or price) function that, given a quantity of good, gives the price at which
this quantity is sold. If we suppose that P is bounded and attains the value 0 from a certain qmax
on, then we get that the aggregate state set A is equal to the set of strategies S(i) ≡ S, and both
are the interval [0, qmax]. The aggregation operator, the integral of the production profile q, gives
aggregate production Q =
∫
I
q(i) di.
On this example we can make the observation that the state of he game could be chosen to
be the price instead of aggregate production. This is not always the case if we want to obtain the
properties stated further on in this work. However, since this example is one-dimensional, it is the
case that most of the properties herein presented are passed on from the aggregate production set
to the price set.
We are interested now on the plausibility of the equilibrium forecasts, or equivalently to the
assessment of the strength of expectational coordination described here. Our assessment relies on
the concepts of Rationalizability (Bernheim 1984; Pearce 1984) or on the derived concepts, in our
economic framework, of Strong Rationality (Guesnerie 1992). In the next two sections then, we
exploit the game-theoretical viewpoint to asses Rationalizability in the economic context.
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3 Rationalizability and the “eductive learning viewpoint”.
3.1 Rationalizability : the game viewpoint.
Rationalizability is associated with the work of Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984). The set of
Rationalizable Strategy profiles were defined and characterized in the context of games with a
finite number of players, continuous utility functions and compact strategy spaces. It has been
argued that Rationalizable strategy profiles are profiles that can not be discarded as outcomes of
the game based on the premises of rationality of players, independence of decision making and
common knowledge (see Tan and da Costa Werlang (1988)).
First, agents only use strategies that are best responses to their forecasts and so strategies
in S that are never best response will never be used; second, agents know that other agents are
rational and so know that the others will not use the strategies that are not best responses and
so each agent may find that some of his remaining strategies may no longer be best responses,
since each agent knows that all agents know, etc. . This process continues ad-infinitum. The set
of Rationalizable solutions is such that it is a fixed point of the elimination process, and it is the
maximal set that has such a property (Basu and Weibull 1991).
Rationalizability has been studied in games with finite number of players. In a game with a
continuum of agents, the analysis has to be adapted. Following Jara-Moroni (2007), and coming
to our setting, in a game-theoretical perspective, the recursive process of elimination of non best
responses, when agents have point expectations, is associated with the mapping Pr : P(SI) →
P(SI) which to each subset H ⊆ SI associates the set Pr(H) defined by:
Pr(H) :=
{
s ∈ SI : s is a measurable selection of i ⇒ Br(i,H)} . (3.1)
The operator Pr represents the process under which we obtain strategy profiles that are con-
structed as the reactions of agents to strategy profiles contained in the set H ⊆ SI . If it is known
that the outcome of the game is in a subset H ⊆ SI , with point expectations, the strategies of
agent i ∈ I are restricted to the set Br(i,H) ≡ ⋃s∈H Br(i, s) and so actual strategy profiles must
be measurable selections of the set valued mapping i ⇒ Br(i,H). It has to be kept in mind
that strategies of different agents in a strategy profile in Pr(H) can be the reactions to (possibly)
different strategy profiles in H.
We then define :
Definition 3.1. The set of Point-Rationalizable9 Strategy Profiles is the maximal subset H ⊆ SI
that satisfies:
H ≡ Pr(H) . (3.2)
and we note it PS .
Rationalizable Strategies should be obtained from a similar exercise but considering forecasts
as probability measures over the set of strategies of the opponents. Loosely speaking each player
should consider a profile of probability measures (his forecasts over each of his opponents play)
and maximize some expected utility, expectation taken over an induced probability measure over
the set of strategy profiles. A difficulty in a context with continuum of players, relates with the
continuity or measurability properties that must be attributed to subjective beliefs, as a function of
the agent’s name. There is no straightforward solution in any case. However, in our framework it
is possible to bypass this difficulty. We present in the next section the concepts of Rationalizable
States and Point-Rationalizable States, where forecasts and the process of elimination are now
taken over the set of states A.
9Following Bernheim (1984) we refer as Point-Rationalizability to the case of forecasts as points in the set
of strategies or states and plain Rationalizability to the case of forecasts as probability distributions over the
corresponding set.
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3.2 Rationalizability : an “economic” viewpoint.
Before going to the rationalizability, it is useful to describe the Cobweb mapping, which we will
refer to sometimes later as the Iterative Expectational process.
3.2.1 Cobweb Mapping and Equilibrium
Given the optimal strategy correspondence, B(i, · ), defined in (2.5) we can define the cobweb
mapping10 Γ : A ⇒ A:
Γ(a) :=
∫
I
B(i, a) di (3.3)
This correspondence represents the actual possible states of the model when all agents react to
the same state a ∈ A. Following Definition 2.3 we see that the equilibria of the economic system
are identified with the fixed points of the cobweb mapping.
Definition 3.2. The set of Aggregate Cobweb Taˆtonnement Outcomes, CA, is defined by:
CA :=
⋂
t≥0
Γt(A)
where Γt is the tth iterate11 of the correspondence Γ.
From the proof of Theorem 2.2 (see Rath (1992)) we get that in our framework the cobweb
mapping Γ is upper semi continuous as a set valued mapping, with non-empty, compact and convex
values Γ(a).
3.2.2 State Rationalizability
Below we present the mathematical formulation of Point-Rationalizable States and Rationalizable
States, and explore the relation between Point-Rationalizability and Rationalizability in our con-
text. We aim at clarifying the different perspectives on equilibrium stability and the connections
between the notions of local and global Strong Rationality (Section 3.2.3)). For the proofs of the
results herein stated and a more detailed treatment the reader is referred to Jara-Moroni (2007).
Analogously to what is done in subsection 3.1, given the optimal strategy correspondence
defined in equation (2.5) we can define the process of non reachable or non generated states,
considering forecasts as points in the set of states, as follows:
P˜ r(X) :=
∫
I
B(i,X) di (3.4)
This is, if initially agents’ common knowledge about the actual state of the model is a subset
X ⊆ A we have that forecasts are constrained by X. Then, if expectations are restricted to
point-expectations, agents deduce that the possible actions of each agent i ∈ I are in the set
B(i,X) :=
⋃
a∈X B(i, a). Since all agents know this, each agent can only discard the strategy
profiles s ∈ SI that are not a selection of the mappings that assign each agent to the these sets.
Finally, they would conclude that the actual state outcome will be restricted to the set obtained
as the integral of this set valued mapping.
Definition 3.3. The set of Point-Rationalizable States is the maximal subset X ⊆ A that satisfies
the condition:
X ≡ P˜ r(X)
and we note it PA.
10The name cobweb mapping comes from the familiar cobweb taˆtonnement although in this general context the
process of iterations of this mapping may not necessarily have a cobweb-like graphic representation.
11This is:
Γ0 := A Γt := Γ(Γt(A))
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We define similarly the set of Rationalizable States. The difference between Rationalizability
and Point-Rationalizability is that in Rationalizability forecasts are no longer constrained to points
in the set of outcomes. To assess Rationalizability we consider the correspondence B(i, · ) :
P(A) ⇒ S defined in (2.6). The process of elimination of non expected-utility-maximizers
is described with the mapping R˜ : B(A)→ P(A):
R˜(X) :=
∫
I
B(i,P(X)) di (3.5)
If it is common knowledge that the actual state is restricted to a borel subset X ⊆ A, then
agents will use strategies only in the set B(i,P(X)) := ∪µ∈P(X)B(i, µ) where P(X) stands for the
set of probability measures whose support is contained in X. Forecasts of agents can not give
positive weight to points that do not belong to X. Strategy profiles then will be selections of the
correspondence i ⇒ B(i,P(X)). The state of the system will be the integral of one of these
selections.
Definition 3.4. The set of Rationalizable States is the maximal subset X ⊆ A that satisfies:
R˜(X) ≡ X (3.6)
and we note it RA.
The difference between P˜ r and R˜ is that the second operator considers expected utility maxi-
mizers and so for a given borel set X ⊆ A we have P˜ r(X) ⊆ R˜(X). We get directly the result in
Proposition 4.1 below.
Bypassing the game-theoretical difficulties occurring in games with a continuum of players, the
states set approach provides a substitute for the Rationalizability concept.
3.2.3 Rationalizability : the game versus the economic viewpoint
Rationalizability in the context of the games with continuum of players that we are considering
is studied in Jara-Moroni (2007). Therein it is proved that, in our context, the set of Point-
Rationalizable pure Strategies is paired with the set of Point-Rationalizable States; moreover,
in the context of the original model of Schmeidler12 these sets are also paired with the set of
Rationalizable (pure) Strategies. We state the result that is pertinent to our framework.
Proposition 3.5. We have:
PS ≡
{
s ∈ SI : s is a measurable selection of i ⇒ B(i,PA)
}
(3.7)
PA ≡
{
a ∈ A : a =
∫
I
s(i) di and s is a measurable function in PS
}
. (3.8)
Equations (3.7) and (3.8) stress the equivalence for point-rationalizability between the state
approach and the strategic approach in games with continuum of players : the sets of point-
rationalizable states can be obtained from the set of point-rationalizable strategies and vice versa.
In (3.7) we see that the strategy profiles in PS are profiles of best responses to PA. Conversely in
(3.8) we get that the points in PA are obtained as integrals of the profiles in PS .
We will make use of Proposition 3.6 below, which provides, in the continuum of agents frame-
work, a key technical property of the set of Point-Rationalizable States.
Proposition 3.6. The set of Point-Rationalizable States can be computed as
PA ≡
∞⋂
t=0
P˜ r
t
(A)
The set PA, indeed obtains as the outcome of the iterative elimination of unreachable states.
12The functions u(i, · , · ) are defined on a finite strategy set S and depend on the integral of a mixed strategy
profile.
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4 Rationalizable outcomes, Equilibria and Stability
4.1 The global viewpoint.
We denote by E ⊆ A, the set of equilibria of the economic system. The inclusions below are unsur-
prising, in the sense that they reflect the decreasing strength of the expectational coordination hy-
pothesis, when going from equilibria to Aggregate Cournot outcomes, then to Point-Rationalizable
States, and finally to Rationalizable States.
Proposition 4.1. We have:
E ⊆ CA ⊆ PA ⊆ RA
The first inclusion is direct since fixed points of Γ are obtained as integrals of selections of the
best response correspondence i ⇒ B(i, a∗) and so will not be eliminated during the process that
characterizes the set CA. We can obtain the two last inclusions of Proposition 4.1 noting that if
a set satisfies X ⊆ P˜ r(X) then it is contained in PA and equivalently if it satisfies X ⊆ R˜(X)
then it is contained in RA. Then, the second inclusion is obtained from the fact that each point
in CA, as a singleton, satisfies {a∗} ⊆ P˜ r({a∗}) and the third inclusion is true because the set PA
satisfies PA ⊆ R˜(PA).
An important corollary of Proposition 3.6 is that the set of Point-Rationalizable States is
convex. This is a specific and nice property of our setting with a continuum of agents.
Theorem 4.2.
The set of Point-Rationalizable States is well defined, non-empty, convex and compact.
The set of Rationalizable States is non-empty and convex.
Proof. The properties are obtained from the convexity of each of the sets that are involved in
the intersection in the characterization of PA in Proposition 3.6. That is, PA is the intersection
of a nested family of non-empty, compact, convex sets. Non-emptiness of PA is guaranteed by
Proposition 3.6 along with Theorem 2.2, since an equilibrium would never be eliminated, and so
there exists a point a∗ ∈ A that belongs to every set P˜ rt(A). Proposition 4.1 implies the property
for RA, while its’ convexity obtains from the definition.

In Evans and Guesnerie (1993), two stability concepts of Rational Expectations Equilibria are
compared: Iterative Expectational Stability, based on the convergence of iterations of forecasts;
and Strong Rationality, based on the uniqueness of the Rationalizable Outcomes (Guesnerie 1992)
of an economic model. In what follows, we define these two concepts following the terminology of
Guesnerie and Evans and Guesnerie, for our setting.
Definition 4.3. An equilibrium a∗ is said to be Globally Iterative Expectationaly Stable if ∀
a0 ∈ V any sequence at ∈ Γ(at−1) satisfies limt→∞ at = a∗ (= E).
The terminology of Iterative Expectational Stability is adopted from the literature on expec-
tational stability in dynamical systems (Evans and Guesnerie (1993, 2003, 2005)). It captures
the idea that virtual coordination processes converge globally, under the implicit assumption that
agents have homogenous deterministic expectations.
Definition 4.4. The equilibrium state a∗ is (globally) Strongly Point Rational if
PA ≡ {a∗} (= E).
The idea is now hat virtual coordination processes converge globally, under the implicit as-
sumption that agents have heterogenous and deterministic expectations.
Definition 4.5. The equilibrium state a∗ is (globally) Strongly Rational if
RA ≡ {a∗} (= E).
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Eductive coordination then obtains when agents have heterogenous and stochastic expectations.
Strong Rationality and Strong Point Rationality can be related to heterogeneous beliefs of
agents. Both concepts refer to heterogenous forecasts of agents, (even if these agents were ho-
mogeneous (have the same utility function)). With Strong rationality, forecasts are based on
stochastic expectations, when with Strong Point Rationalizability, we restrict attention to point
expectations. When we turn to Iterative Expectational Stability (IE-Stability), we drop the pos-
sibility of heterogeneity of forecasts. The iterative process associated with IE-Stability is based
on iterations of the cobweb mapping Γ which describe agents reactions to the same point forecast
over the set of states.
It is straightforward that these concepts are increasingly demanding : Strong Rationality
implies Strong Point Rationalizability that implies Iterative Expectational Stability.
We turn now to the local version of these concepts.
4.2 The local viewpoint.
We now give the local version of the above stability concepts.
Again, the definition of (local) IE-Stability (Lucas 1978; DeCanio 1979), stated below is similar
to the one given in Evans and Guesnerie (1993)
Definition 4.6. An equilibrium a∗ is said to be Locally Iterative Expectationaly Stable if there
is a neighborhood V 3 a∗ such that ∀ a0 ∈ V any sequence at ∈ Γ(at−1) satisfies limt→∞ at = a∗.
Definition 4.7. An equilibrium state a∗ is Locally Strongly Point Rational if there exists a
neighborhood V 3 a∗ such that the process governed by P˜ r started at V generates a nested family
that leads to a∗. This is, ∀ t ≥ 1,
P˜ r
t
(V ) ⊂ P˜ rt−1(V )
and ⋂
t≥0
P˜ r
t
(V ) ≡ {a∗} .
Definition 4.8. An equilibrium state a∗ is Locally Strongly Rational (Guesnerie 1992) if there
exists a neighborhood V 3 a∗ such that the eductive process governed by R˜ started at V generates
a nested family that leads to a∗. This is, ∀ t ≥ 1,
R˜t(V ) ⊂ R˜t−1(V )
and ⋂
t≥0
R˜t(V ) ≡ {a∗} .
The connections between the concepts stressed in the next Proposition, are straightforward.
Proposition 4.9. We have:
(i) a∗ is (Locally) Strongly Rational =⇒ a∗ is (Locally) IE-Stable.
(ii) a∗ is Locally Strongly Rational =⇒ a∗ is Locally Strongly Point Rational.
A sufficient condition for the converse to be true is that there exist a neighborhood V of a∗
such that for almost all i ∈ I, for any borel subset X ⊆ V :
B(i,P(X)) ⊆ co {B(i,X)} (4.1)
The proof of this and of the following Proposition are relegated to the appendix.
At a first glance the hypothesis in the second part of Proposition 4.9 appears to be very
restrictive, however it involves only local properties of the agents’ utility functions. It intuitively
states that given a restriction on common knowledge (subsets of the set V ), when agents evaluate
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all the possible actions to take when facing probability forecasts with support ”close” to the
equilibrium, these actions are somehow ”not to far” or ”surrounded” by the set of actions that could
be taken when facing point forecasts (B(i, µ) ⊆ co {B(i,X)} if supp(µ) ⊆ X). The assumption is
true in most applications and standard assumptions over utility functions imply it.
Condition (4.1) relates the individual reactions of agents facing non degenerate subjective
forecasts, with their reactions when facing point (dirac) forecasts. A different approach can be
overtaken when comparing the aggregate reaction of the system to common knowledge on the
restriction of the possible outcomes. In this approach we are interested on the convergence of the
process generated by point forecasts. If this convergence is sufficiently fast, then we say that the
equilibrium is Strictly Locally Point Rational, and we may get that this convergence speed, drags
the eductive process to the equilibrium as well.
For a positive number α > 0 and a set V ⊆ A that contains a unique equilibrium a∗ we will
denote by Vα the set:
Vα := {x ∈ A : x = α(v − a∗) , v ∈ V }
Definition 4.10. We say that an equilibrium state a∗ is Strictly Locally Point Rational if it is
Locally Strongly Point Rational and there is a number k¯ < 1 such that, ∀ 0 < α ≥ 1,
sup
v∈P˜ r(Vα)
‖ v − a∗‖ < k¯ sup
v′∈Vα
‖ v′ − a∗‖ .
Strict Locally Point Rationality assesses the idea of fast convergence of the point forecast
process. Under this property, we have that P˜ r(V ) ⊂ Vk¯, with k¯ < 1, and so P˜ r
t
(V ) ⊂ Vk¯t .
Proposition 4.11. If the utility functions are twice continuously differentiable, a∗ ∈ intA, B(i, µ)
is single valued for all µ with support in a neighborhood of a∗ and Duss(s, a) is non singular in
an open set V 3 a∗, then
a∗ is Locally Strongly Rational ⇐⇒ a∗ is Strictly Locally Point Rational.
The idea of the proposition is that if the process governed by point forecasts is sufficiently fast,
then, although the eductive process may be slower, it is anyhow dragged to the equilibrium state.
This is, the eductive process may converge at a lower rate, it can not escape the force of P˜ r.
5 Economic games with strategic complementarities or sub-
stitutabilities.
5.1 Economic games with strategic complementarities.
In this section we want to study the consequences over expectational coordination and eductive
stability of the presence of Strategic Complementarities in our Economic System with a Continuum
of Agents. We will say that the economic system presents Strategic Complementarities if the
individual best response mappings of the underlying game are increasing for each i ∈ I. That is,
if we consider the general payoff functions pi(i, · , · ) : S × SI → R, the usual product order in Rn
over S and the order ≥SI defined by s ≥SI s′ if and only if s(i) ≥ s(i)′ for almost all i ∈ I, over
SI , then we would like the mappings Br(i, · ) : SI ⇒ S defined in (2.4) to be increasing for the
induced set ordering in S. That is, if s ≥SI s′ then Br(i, s)  Br(i, s′).
The most classical representation of complementarity in games is the theory of supermodular
games as studied in Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Vives (1990) (see as well Topkis (1998)). In
a supermodular game, a normal form game with a finite number of players is embedded within a
lattice structure.
A normal form game G := 〈I,(Si)i∈I ,(pii( · , · ))i∈I〉 is supermodular if ∀ i ∈ I:
1.A Si is a complete lattice.
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2.A pii(si, s−i) is order upper semi-continuous in si and order continuous in s−i, with finite upper
bound.
3.A pii( · , s−i) is supermodular on si for all s−i ∈ S−i
4.A pii(si, s−i) has increasing differences in si and s−i
We will understand strategic complementarity then, as supermodularity of the underlying
game. Supermodularity (and of course submodularity as in the next section) could be studied
in the context of games with continuum of agents with a broad generality using the strategic
approach (using for instance the tools available from Riesz spaces). However, our present concern
suggests to focus on the set of states and introduce strategic complementarities ideas directly in
this framework. This last assertion is not at all superfluous since it is the fact that we work with a
continuous of agents that allows to focus on forecasts over the set of aggregate states. Since agents
can not affect the state of the system, all agents have forecasts over the same set, namely the set
of states A. This would not be possible in the context of small game since then the forecast
of different agents would be in different sets, namely the set of aggregate values of the others
which could well be a different set for each agent. Another difficulty is passing from strategies to
states in terms of complementarity. Part of the work to be presented focuses on the possibility
of inheritance by the state approach of the properties of complementarity (and substitutability
in the next section). An important result related with this issue is treated in Lemma A.2 in the
appendix.
Our objective will then be to understand the consequences of the assumptions introduced on all
the sets under scrutiny (equilibria, Cournot outcomes, Point-Rationalizable States, Rationalizable
States).
Let us proceed as suggested and make, in the economic setting, the following assumptions over
the strategy set S and the utility functions u(i, · , · ).
1.B S is the product of n compact intervals in R+.
2.B u(i, · , a) is supermodular for all a ∈ A and all i ∈ I.
3.B ∀ i ∈ I, the function u(i, y, a) has increasing differences in y and a. That is, ∀ y, y′ ∈ S, such
that y ≥ y′ and ∀ a, a′ ∈ A such that a ≥ a′:
u(i, y, a)− u(i, y′, a) ≥ u(i, y, a′)− u(i, y′, a′) (5.1)
Assumption 2.B is straightforward. Assumption 1.B implies that the set of strategies is a complete
lattice in Rn. Since in our model we already assumed that the utility functions u(i, · , · ) are
continuous, we obtain that in particular the functions pi(i, · , · ) satisfy 2.A (endowing SI with the
weak topology for instance, this is of no relevance for what follows). Finally, if we look at A and
SI as ordered sets (with the product order of Rn in A and ≥SI in SI), we see that the aggregation
mapping A : SI → A is increasing, and so assumption 3.B implies 4.A.
Proposition 5.1. Under assumptions 1.B through 3.B, the mappings B(i, · ) are increasing in a
in the set A, and the sets B(i, a) are complete sublattices of S.
Proof. The first property is a consequence of Theorem 2 in Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and the
second part we apply Theorem 2.8.1 in Topkis (1998) considering the constant correspondence
Sa ≡ S ∀ a ∈ A 
Definition 5.2. We name G, an economic system such that S and u(i, · , · ) satisfy assumptions
1.B through 3.B.
One implication of our setting is that since S is a convex complete lattice, then A ≡ co {S} ≡ S
is as well a complete lattice. From now on we will refer to the supermodular setting as G.
Proposition 5.3. In G the correspondence Γ is increasing and Γ(a) is subcomplete for each a ∈ A.
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Recall that the set of equilibria is E ⊆ A and this is the set of fixed points of Γ. For a
correspondence F : A ⇒ A, we will denote the set of fixed points of F as EF . Consequently
E ≡ EΓ. We see now that under assumptions 1.B through 3.B we get the hypothesis of Proposition
5.4.
Proposition 5.4. If A is a complete lattice, Γ is increasing, Γ(a) is subcomplete for each a ∈ A,
then E 6= ∅ is a complete lattice.
Proof. As a consequence of the Theorem 2.5.1 in Topkis (1998) EΓ is a non-empty complete
lattice. 
In the previous proposition we have an existence result, but what is most important is that
the set of equilibria has a complete lattice structure. In particular we know that there exist points
a∗ ∈ A and a¯∗ ∈ A (that could be the same point) such that if a∗ ∈ E is an equilibrium, then
a∗ ≤ a∗ ≤ a¯∗.
The previous results tell us that when the economic system’s underlying game is supermodular
and since the aggregate mapping is monotone (in this case increasing), then we can apply Propo-
sition 5.4 and work in a finite dimensional setting (the set A) rather than infinite dimensional.
We state this as a formal result in the next proposition.
Proposition 5.5. In G we have
PA ⊆
[
inf
EΓ
{EΓ} , sup
EΓ
{EΓ}
]
and infEΓ {EΓ} and supEΓ {EΓ} are equilibria.
The proof is relegated to the appendix. The intuitive interpretation of the proof is as follows.
Originally, agents know that the state of the system will be greater than inf A and smaller than
supA. Since the actual state is in the image through P˜ r of A, the monotonicity properties of the
forecasts to state mappings allow agents to deduce that the actual state will be in fact greater
than the image through Γ of the constant forecast a0 = inf A and smaller than the image through
Γ of the constant forecast a¯0 = supA. That is, it suffices to consider the cases where all the
agents having the same forecasts inf A and supA. The eductive procedure then can be secluded
on each iteration, only with iterations of Γ. Since Γ is increasing, we get an increasing sequence
that starts at a0 and a deceasing sequence that starts at a¯0. These sequence converge and upper
semi continuity of Γ implies that their limits are fixed points of Γ.
There are three key features to keep in mind, that lead to the conclusion. First, the fact that
there exists a set A that, being a complete lattice and having as a subset the whole image of the
mapping A, allows the eductive process to be initiated. Second, monotonic structure of the model
implies that it suffices to use Γ to seclude, in each step, the set obtained from the eductive process
into a compact interval. Third, continuity properties of the utility functions and the structure
of the model allow the process to converge. Now that we have proved this result for the Point-
Rationalizable set, we can use the proof of Proposition 5.5 to get the same conclusion for the set
of Rationalizable States. For this we use the following Lemma.
Lemma 5.6. In G, for a′ ∈ A and µ ∈ P(A), if a′ ≤ a, ∀ a ∈ supp(µ). Then ∀ i ∈ I
B(i, a′)  B(i, µ) ,
equivalently, if a′ ≥ a, ∀ a ∈ supp(µ). Then ∀ i ∈ I
B(i, a′)  B(i, µ) .
This is, if the forecast of an agent has support on points that are larger than a point a′ ∈ A,
then his optimal strategy set is larger than the optimal strategy associated to a′ (for the induced
set ordering) and analogously for the second statement.
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Proof. Observe first that supermodularity of u(i, · , a) is preserved13 when we take expectation on
a.
Now consider y′ ∈ B(i, a′) and y ∈ B(i, µ) we show that min {y, y′} ∈ B(i, a′) and max {y, y′} ∈
B(i, µ). Since y′ ∈ B(i, a′) we have that:
0 ≤ u(i, y′, a′)− u(i,min {y, y′} , a′) .
Increasing differences of u(i, y, a) in (y, a) implies that ∀ a ∈ supp(µ),
u(i, y′, a′)− u(i,min {y, y′} , a′) ≤ u(i, y′, a)− u(i,min {y, y′} , a)
and so if on the right hand side we take expectation with respect to µ we get
u(i, y′, a′)− u(i,min {y, y′} , a′) ≤ Eµ [u(i, y′, a)]− Eµ [u(i,min {y, y′} , a)] .
Supermodularity of u(i, · , a) implies that
Eµ [u(i, y′, a)]− Eµ [u(i,min {y, y′} , a)] ≤ Eµ [u(i,max {y, y′} , a)]− Eµ [u(i, y, a)]
and the last term is less or equal to 0 since y ∈ B(i, µ).
All these inequalities together imply that max {y, y′} ∈ B(i, µ) and min {y, y′} ∈ B(i, a′)
The second statement is proved analogously.

The fact that the points supEΓ {EΓ} and infEΓ {EΓ} are equilibria, implies that they are
Point-Rationalizable and Rationalizable states and so Proposition 5.5 states that the interval[
infEΓ {EΓ} , supEΓ {EΓ}
]
is the smallest interval that contains the set PA. Considering Lemma
5.6 and the proof of Proposition 5.5 we get that this same interval contains tightly the set RA.
Theorem 5.7. In the economic system with Strategic Complementarities we have:
(i) The set of equilibria E ⊆ A is complete lattice.
(ii) There exist a greatest equilibrium and a smallest equilibrium, that is ∃ a∗ ∈ E and a¯∗ ∈ E
such that ∀ a∗ ∈ E, a∗ ≤ a∗ ≤ a¯∗.
(iii) The sets of Rationalizable and Point-Rationalizable States are convex sets, tightly contained
in the interval [a∗, a¯∗]. That is,
PA ⊆ RA ⊆ {a∗}+Rn+
⋂
{a¯∗} −Rn+
and a¯∗ ∈ PA and a∗ ∈ PA.
Proof. Using Lemma 5.6 in the proof of Proposition 5.5 we can see that R˜t(A) ⊆ [at, a¯t] and so
we get the result.

Convexity of PA implies the convex hull of E is contained in PA, in particular the segment
{ a ∈ A : a = αa∗ +(1− α) a¯∗ α ∈ [0, 1]} ⊆ PA ⊆ RA
Let us also note :
13If u(i, · , a) is supermodular, then for s, s′ ∈ S, we have for each a ∈ A:
u
(
i,min
{
s, s′
}
, a
)
+ u
(
i,max
{
s, s′
}
, a
)−(u(i, s, a) + u(i, s′, a)) ≥ 0
Taking expectation we get the result.
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Figure 1: Strategic Complementarities for A ⊂ R2 with four equilibria.
Corollary 5.8. If in G Γ has a unique fixed point a∗, then
RA ≡ PA ≡ {a∗} .
Our results are unsurprising. In the context of an economic game with a continuum of agents,
they mimic, in an expected way, the standards results obtained in a game-theoretical framework
with a finite number of agents and strategic complementarities. Additional convexity properties
reflect the use of a continuum setting.
We see from Theorem 5.7 and Corollary 5.8, that under the presence of strategic complemen-
tarity, uniqueness of equilibrium implies the success of the elimination of unreasonable states. The
unique equilibrium is then Strongly Rational and this stability is global.
Corollary 5.9. In G, the three following statements are equivalent:
(i) an equilibrium a∗ is Strongly Rational.
(ii) an equilibrium a∗ is IE-Stable.
(iii) there exists a unique equilibrium a∗.
Proof. From the definitions of both concepts of stability we see that Strong Rationality implies
IE-Stability. The relevant part of the corollary is then that under Strategic Complementarities,
we have the inverse. If a∗ is IE-Stable, then from the proof of Proposition 5.5 we see that the
sequences {at}t≥0 and {a¯t}t≥0 must both converge to a∗ and so we get that a∗ is Eductively
Stable.

This last statement may be interpreted as the fact that in the present setting, heterogeneity of
expectations does not play any role in expectational coordination. This is a very special feature
of expectational coordination as argued in Evans and Guesnerie (1993). Surprisingly enough, a
similar feature appears in the next class of models under consideration.
5.2 Economic games with Strategic Substitutabilities
We turn to the case of Strategic Substitutabilities. We will say that the economic system presents
Strategic Substitutabilities if the individual best response mappings of the underlying game are
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decreasing for each i ∈ I. That is, if s ≥SI s′ then Br(i, s)  Br(i, s′). Where Br(i, · ) and ≥SI
are the same as in section 5.1.
To study the consequences of embedding our model in a setting of strategic substitutabilities
we use the same structure as in the previous section except that we replace assumption 3.B with
assumption 3.B’ below.
1.B S is the product of n compact intervals in R+.
2.B u(i, · , a) is supermodular for all a ∈ A
3.B’ u(i, y, a) has decreasing differences in y and a. That is, ∀ y, y′ ∈ S, such that y ≥ y′ and ∀
a, a′ ∈ A such that a ≥ a′:
u(i, y, a)− u(i, y′, a) ≤ u(i, y, a′)− u(i, y′, a′) (5.2)
Assumptions 1.B through 3.B’ turn the underlying game of our model into a submodular game14
with a continuum of agents. The relevant difference with the previous section is that now the
monotonicity of the mapping A along with assumption 3.B’ implies that the best response map-
pings are decreasing on the strategy profiles.
Example 2. : This example is the model described in Guesnerie (2001b). There is a production
sector of L sectors indexed by l, with Nl firms in each sector. Firms hire workers at a fixed wage
w and sell at price pl. Firm i’s in sector l supply function is denoted Sli(pl/w).
The following Propositions are the counterparts of Propositions 5.1 and 5.3.
Proposition 5.10. Under assumptions 1.B, 2.B and 3.B’, the mappings B(i, · ) are decreasing
in a in the set A, and the sets B(i, a) are complete sublattices of S.
Definition 5.11. We name G′, an economic system such that S and u(i, · , · ) satisfy assumptions
1.B, 2.B, and 3.B’.
Proposition 5.12. In G the correspondence Γ is decreasing and Γ(a) is subcomplete for each
a ∈ A.
We denote Γ2 for the second iterate of the cobweb mapping, that is Γ2 : A ⇒ A, Γ2(a) :=
∪a′∈Γ(a)Γ(a′).
Corollary 5.13. In G the correspondence Γ2 is increasing and Γ2(a) is subcomplete for each
a ∈ A.
Proof. Is a consequence of Γ being decreasing.

The correspondence Γ2 will be our main tool for the case of strategic substitutabilities. This
is because, in the general context, the fixed points of Γ2 are point-rationalizable just as the fixed
points of Γ are. Actually, it is direct to see that the fixed points of any iteration of the mapping
Γ are as well point-rationalizable. The relevance of strategic substitutabilities is that under their
presence it suffices to use the second iterate of the cobweb mapping to seclude the set of point-
rationalizable states. Using Proposition 5.4 we get that under assumptions 1.B, 2.B and 3.B’, the
set of fixed points of Γ2, EΓ2 , shares the properties that the set of equilibria E had under strategic
complementarities.
Proposition 5.14. The set of fixed points of Γ2, EΓ2 is a non empty complete lattice.
Proof. Apply Proposition 5.4 to Γ2.

14A submodular game is a game under assumptions 1.A to 3.A with assumption 4.A replaced by assumption
4.A’: the payoff functions pii(si, s−i) have decreasing differences in (si, s−i)
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The relevance of Proposition 5.14 is that, as in the case of strategic complementarities, under
strategic substitutabilities it is possible to seclude the set of Point-Rationalizable States into a
tight compact interval. This interval is now obtained from the complete lattice structure of the
set of fixed points of Γ2, which can be viewed, in a multi-period context, as cycles of order 2 of
the system.
Proposition 5.15. In G′ we have
PA ⊆
[
inf
EΓ2
{EΓ2} , sup
EΓ2
{EΓ2}
]
and infEΓ2 {EΓ2} and supEΓ2 {EΓ2} are point-rationalizable.
The proof is relegated to the appendix. Keeping in mind the proof of Proposition 5.5, we can
follow the idea of the proof of Proposition 5.15. As usual, common knowledge says that the state
of the system will be greater than inf A and smaller than supA. In first order basis then, the
actual state is known to be in the image through P˜ r of A. Since now the cobweb mapping is
decreasing, the structure of the model allows the agents to deduce that the actual state will be
in fact smaller than the image through Γ of the constant forecast a0 = inf A and greater than
the image through Γ of the constant forecast a¯0 = supA. That is, again it suffices to consider
the cases where all the agents having the same forecasts inf A and supA and this will give a1,
associated to a¯0, and a¯1, associated to a0. However, now we have a difference with the strategic
complementarities case. In the previous section the iterations started in the lower bound of the
state set were lower bounds of the iterations of the eductive process. As we see, this is not the
case anymore. Nevertheless, here is where the second iterate of Γ gains relevance. In a second
order basis, once we have a1 and a¯1 obtained as above, we can now consider the images through
Γ of these points and we get new points a¯2, from a1, and a2, from a¯1, that are respectively upper
and lower bounds of the second step of the eductive process. This is, in two steps we obtain that
the iterations started at the upper (resp. lower) bound of the states set is un upper (resp. lower)
bound of the second step of the eductive process. Moreover, the sequences obtained by the second
iterates are increasing when started at a0 and decreasing when started at a¯0. The complete lattice
structure of A again implies the convergence of the monotone sequences while Γ2 inherits upper
semi continuity from Γ. This implies that the limits of the sequences are fixed points of Γ2.
The three key features that lead to the conclusion are analogous to the strategic complemen-
tarity case. First, A is a complete lattice that has as a subset its’ image through the function A
and thus allows the eductive process to be initiated. Second, monotonic structure of the model
implies that it now suffices to use Γ2 to seclude, every second step, the set obtained from the
eductive process into a compact interval. Third, continuity properties of the utility functions and
the monotonic structure of the model allow the process to converge.
Note that, also as in the case of strategic complementarities, since the limits of the interval
in Proposition 5.15 are point-rationalizable, this is the smallest interval that contains the set of
point-rationalizable states.
Adapting the proof of Lemma 5.6 to the decreasing differences case, we obtain its’ counterpart
for the strategic substitutabilities case stated below.
Lemma 5.16. In G′, for a′ ∈ A and µ ∈ P(A), if a′ ≤ a, ∀ a ∈ supp(µ). Then ∀ i ∈ I
B(i, a′)  B(i, µ) ,
equivalently, if a′ ≥ a, ∀ a ∈ supp(µ). Then ∀ i ∈ I
B(i, a′)  B(i, µ) .
We are now able to state the main result of the strategic substitutabilities case.
Theorem 5.17. In the economic system with Strategic Substitutabilities we have:
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(i) There exists at least one equilibrium a∗.
(ii) There exist greatest and a smallest rationalizable strategies, that is ∃ a ∈ RA and a¯ ∈ RA
such that ∀ a ∈ RA, a ≤ a ≤ a¯, where a and a¯ are cycles of order 2 of the Cobweb mapping.
(iii) The sets of Rationalizable and Point-Rationalizable States are convex.
(iv) The sets of Rationalizable and Point-Rationalizable States are tightly contained in the interval
[a, a¯]. That is,
PA ⊆ RA ⊆ {a}+Rn+
⋂
{a¯} −Rn+
and a¯ ∈ PA and a ∈ PA.
Proof. Using Lemma 5.16 in the proof of Proposition 5.15 we can see that R˜2t(A) ⊆ [a2t, a¯2t] and
so we get the two first results.
The last assertion is a consequence of the general setting of Rath (1992). Theorem 2.2 gives
the existence of equilibrium.

Summing up, we have that in the case of Strategic Substitutabilities we can still use the corre-
spondence Γ (through its’ second iterate) to seclude to an interval the sets of Point-Rationalizable
and Rationalizable States. This inclusion is tight since the boundaries of this interval are in fact
Point-rationalizable States.
Corollary 5.18. If in G′, Γ2 has a unique fixed point a∗, then
RA ≡ PA ≡ {a∗} .
Proof. Observe that both limits of the interval presented in Theorem 5.17, a and a¯, are fixed
points of Γ2. Hence the result.

As opposed to the case of strategic complementarities, the optimistic equivalence result of
Corollary 5.9 can not be directly obtained in the setting of strategic substitutabilities. If the
sequences b¯t and bt defined in the proof of Proposition 5.15 converge to the same point, i.e.
b∗ = b¯∗ = a∗, then a∗ is the unique equilibrium of the system, it is strongly rational and IE-stable.
However, under strategic substitutabilities there could well be a unique equilibrium that is not
necessarily strongly rational. Think of the case of A ⊂ R, where a continuous decreasing function
Γ has unique fixed point, that could well be part of a bigger set of Point-Rationalizable States
(see figure 2).
Corollary 5.19. The following statements are equivalent.
(i) an equilibrium a∗ is Strongly Rational.
(ii) an equilibrium a∗ is IE-Stable.
Again heterogeneity of expectations in a sense does not matter, for evaluating the quality of
expectational coordination. However, here uniqueness of equilibrium does not assure its’ global
stability. We recover the intuitions stated in Guesnerie (2005).
6 The differentiable case.
Here, we add an assumption concerning the cobweb mapping Γ:
H1 Γ : A → A is a C1-differentiable function.
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6-
b∗
Γ2(b∗) = b∗
b¯∗
Γ2
(
b¯∗
)
= b¯∗
a∗
Γ(a∗) = a∗
0 amax
amax
Figure 2: Strategic substitutes for A ≡ [0, amax] ⊂ R. There exists a unique equilibrium and
multiple fixed points for Γ2
Remark 6.1. Note that from the definition of Γ, the vector-field (a− Γ(a)) points outwards on A :
formally, this means that if p(a) is a supporting price vector at a boundary point of A (p(a)·A ≤ 0),
then p(a) ·(a− Γ(a)) ≥ 0. When, as in most applications A is the product of intervals for example
[0,Mh], this means Γh(a) ≥ 0, whenever ah = 0, and Mh − Γh(a) ≥ 0, whenever ah = Mh.
The jacobian of the function Γ, ∂Γ, can be obtained from the first order conditions of problem
(2.5) along with (3.3).
∂Γ(a) =
∫
I
∂B(i, a) di
where ∂B(i, a) is the jacobian of the optimal strategy (now) function. This jacobian is equal to:
∂B(i, a) ≡ −[Duss(i, B(i, a) , a)]−1Dusa(i, B(i, a) , a) (6.1)
where Duss(i, B(i, a) , a) is the matrix of second derivatives with respect to s of the utility functions
and Dusa(i, B(i, a) , a) is the matrix of cross second derivatives, at the point (B(i, a) , a).
6.1 The strategic complementarities case.
Under assumptions 1.B to 3.B, along with C2 differentiability of the functions u(i, · , · ), we get
from (6.1) that the matrices ∂B(i, a) are positive15, and consequently so is ∂Γ(a).
From the properties of positive matrices are well known. When there exists a positive vector x,
such that Ax < x, the matrix A is said productive : its eigenvalue of highest modulus is positive
and smaller than one. When a is one-dimensional, the condition says that the slope of Γ is smaller
than 1.
In this special case, as well as in our more general framework, the condition has the flavor that
actions do not react too wildly to expectations..
In this case, we obtain :
15It is a well know fact that increasing differences implies positive cross derivatives on Dusa(i, B(i, a) , a) and it
can be proved that for a supermodular function the matrix −[Duss(i, · , · )]−1 is positive at (B(i, a) , a)
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Theorem 6.2 (Uniqueness). If ∀ a ∈ A, ∂Γ(a) is a productive matrix, then there exists a unique
Strongly Rational Equilibrium.
Proof.
Compute in any equilibrium a∗ the sign of det [I − ∂Γ(a∗)]. If ∂Γ(a∗) is productive, its
eigenvalue of highest modulus is real positive and smaller than 1. Hence the real eigenvalues
of [I − ∂Γ(a∗)] are all positive16. It follows that the sign of det [I − ∂Γ(a∗)] is the sign of the char-
acteristics polynomial det{[I − ∂Γ(a∗)]−λI} for λ→ −∞, i.e is plus. The index of ϕ(a) = a−Γ(a)
is then +1. The Poincare´-Hopf theorem for vector fields pointing inwards implies that the sum of
indices must be equal to +1, hence the conclusion of uniqueness. Strong Rationality follows from
Corollary 5.9.

Our assumptions also have consequences for eductive stability.
Theorem 6.3 (Expectational coordination). If sign of det [I − ∂Γ(a∗)] is +, for some equilibrium
a∗, then a∗ is locally eductively stable.
Proof.
Take as initial local hypothetical CK neighborhood
{{a−}+Rn+}∩{{a+} −Rn+} where a− <
a∗ , a+ > a∗, both being close to a∗.
The general argument of Proposition 5.5 works.

The above statements generalize in a reasonable way the intuitive findings easily obtainable
from the one-dimensional model.
6.2 The strategic substitutabilities case.
Let us go to the Strategic Substitutabilities case. We maintain the previous boundary assumptions.
When passing from 3.B to 3.B’ we get that now the matrix ∂Γ has negative17 entries. And
I − ∂Γ(a) is a positive matrix. Again, it has only positive eigenvalues, whenever the positive
eigenvalue of highest modulus of -∂Γ is smaller than 1.
Theorem 6.4. Let us assume that ∀ a1, a2 ∈ A, ∂Γ (a1) ∂Γ (a2) is productive,
1- There exists a unique equilibrium.
2- It is globally Strongly Rational.
Proof.
The assumption implies that ∀a ∈ A, −∂Γ (a) is productive.
Hence I − ∂Γ is a positive matrix, and whenever the positive eigenvalue of highest modulus of
−∂Γ is smaller than 1, it has only positive eigenvalues. Then its determinant is positive.
Then the above Poincare´-Hopf argument applies to the first and second iterate of Γ.
It follows that there exists a unique equilibrium and no two-cycle.
Then, Theorem 5.17 applies.

Also, as above one can show that the productive condition when it holds in one equilibrium
ensures local strong rationality.
16It has at least one real eigenvalue, associated with the eigenvalue of highest modulus of Γ(a∗).
17Since the matrix Dusa(i, B(i, a) , a) has only non-positive entries under strategic substitutabilities (see note
15).
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7 Comments and Conclusions
The Rational Expectations Hypothesis has been subject of scrutiny in recent years through the
assessment of Expectational Coordination. Although the terminology is still fluctuating, the ideas
behind what we call here Strong Rationality or Eductive Stability have been at the heart of
the study of diverse macroeconomic and microeconomic models of standard markets with one or
several goods, see Guesnerie, models of information transmission (Desgranges (2000), Desgranges
and Heinemann (2005), Ben Porath-Heifetz).
In this work we aimed to address the subject of eductive stability with broad generality. We
have presented a stylized framework that encompasses a significant class of economic models. We
have made the connection between what may be called the economic viewpoint and a now standard
line of research in game-theory: games with a continuous of players. The paper has assessed
the connections between a number of tools with game-theoretical flavor which are available for
analyzing the expectational stability or plausibility of equilibria in a so-called economic context
with non-atomic agents. The presence of an aggregate variable in the model allowed for us to go
back and forth between the economic and game-theoretical point of view, making the connection
between the different approaches.
We have exhibited properties of what we called the set of Rationalizable and Point-Rationalizable
States. The Rationalizable set is proved to be non-empty and convex as the set of Point-
Rationalizable States, with this last set also being compact.
In this context, when the economy is dominated by strategic complementarities, we have de-
rived results that reformulate the classical game-theoretical findings of Milgrom and Roberts and
Vives.
In the opposite polar case of strategic substitutabilities, using the properties of the second
iterate of the Cobweb mapping, we have exhibited results that parallel the first ones, while stressing
however striking differences. For example, when in the strategic complementarities, uniqueness
triggers all expectational stability criteria, this is no longer the case with strategic substitutabilities
: uniqueness does not imply expectational stability, whatever the exact sense given to the assertion.
Related remarks apply for local uniqueness that has different implications for local stability in the
two cases under examination. We give then simple and appealing conditions implying uniqueness
of equilibria and stability in the sense of Strong Rationality, although in this case the former does
not imply the latter.
In all cases, it turns out that the eductive process that allows to obtain Point-Rationalizable
and (locally) Strong Rationalizable States can be achieved tightly with the iterative expectations
process or “Cobweb taˆtonnement ” used to explain Iterative Expectational Stability. In both
circumstances, one may argue that heterogeneity of expectations makes no difference for expecta-
tional coordination. This is a most significant feature of these situations that strikingly contrast
the general case studied in Evans and Guesnerie (2005). Many economic models that fit our
framework, such as the one associated with the analysis of expectational stability in a class of
general dynamical systems (Evans and Guesnerie 2005) have neither strategic complementarities
nor substitutabilities. The complexity of the findings that has increased when going from the first
case to the second one, will still increase. In this sense, we hope that these results provide a useful
benchmark for a deeper understanding of the role of the heterogeneity of beliefs in expectational
coordination. The beginning of the road map drawn from this paper should help to continue the
route.
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A Technical Lemmas
Lemma A.1. Under assumptions C and HM, for a closed set X ⊆ A the correspondence
i ⇒ B(i,X) is measurable and has compact values.
Proof.
We show first that the mapping G : I ⇒ A × S, that associates with each agent i ∈ I the
graph of the best response mapping B(i, · ), G(i) := gphB(i, · ), is measurable.
Take a closed set C ⊆ A× S. We need to prove that the set
G−1(C) ≡ {i ∈ I : C ∩ gphB(i, · ) 6= ∅}
is measurable. Consider the subset U ⊆ US×A defined by:
U := { g ∈ US×A : ∃ (a, s) ∈ C such that g(s, a) ≥ g(y, a) ∀ y ∈ S}
note that u−1(U) ≡ G−1(C) and so, from the measurability assumption over u, it suffices to prove
that U is closed. That is, we have to show that for any sequence {gν}ν∈N ⊂ U , such that gν → g∗
uniformly g∗ ∈ U .
Since the functions gν are finite and continuous in S × A, from Weierstrass’ Theorem g∗ is
continuous and so it belongs to US×A. Moreover, gν converges continuously to g∗, that is, for any
convergent sequence (aν , sν) with limit (a∗, s∗), the sequence gν(sν , aν) converges to g∗(s∗, a∗).
Indeed, consider any ε > 0. By the continuity of g∗ there exists ν¯1 ∈ N such that ∀ ν > ν¯1,
|g∗(sν , aν)− g∗(s∗, a∗)| < ε
2
.
From the uniform convergence of gν we get that there exists ν¯2 ∈ N such that,
|gν(s, a)− g∗(s, a)| < ε
2
for all ν ≥ ν¯2 and ∀ (s, a) ∈ S ×A,
in particular this is true for all the elements of the sequence of points. We get then that ∀
ν ≥ max {ν¯1, ν¯2},
|gν(sν , aν)− g∗(s∗, a∗)| ≤ |gν(sν , aν)− g∗(sν , aν)|+ |g∗(sν , aν)− g∗(s∗, a∗)| < ε.
We have to show then that there exists a point (a, s) ∈ C such that g∗(s, a) ≥ g∗(y, a) ∀ y ∈ S.
Since gν ∈ U , we have for each ν ∈ N, points(aν , sν) ∈ C such that gν(sν , aν) ≥ gν(y, aν) ∀ y ∈ S.
Let (a∗, s∗) ∈ C be the limit of a convergent subsequence of {(aν , sν)}ν∈N, which without loss of
generality we can take to be the same sequence. We see that (a∗, s∗) is the point we are looking
for since for a fixed y ∈ S, continuous convergence implies that in the limit
g∗(s∗, a∗) ≥ g∗(y, a∗) .
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We conclude then that g∗ ∈ U . Thus, U is closed and since u is a measurable mapping, u−1(U)
is measurable.
With this in mind, consider a closed set X ⊆ A and the mapping i ⇒ B(i,X). Applying
Theorem 14.3 in Rockafellar and Wets (1998) to the constant mapping i ⇒ X along with G
above, we get that i ⇒ B(i,X) is measurable and has closed values (hence compact since S is
compact).

Lemma A.2. If S ⊂ Rn is a complete lattice for the product order in Rn, then for a measurable
correspondence F : I ⇒ S with nonempty, closed and subcomplete values, the functions s : I → S
and s¯ : I → S, defined by
s(i) := inf
S
F (i) , (A.1)
s¯(i) := sup
S
F (i) , (A.2)
are measurable selections of F .
Proof.
Since F (i) is subcomplete, s(i) and s¯(i) belong to F (i). We have to prove that s and s¯ are
measurable.
Since F is measurable, it has a Castaing representation. That is, there exists a countable
family of measurable functions sν : I → Rn, ν ∈ N, such that sν(i) ∈ F (i) and,
F (i) ≡ cl{{sν(i) : ν ∈ N}} . (A.3)
For s, consider then for each ν ∈ N the set valued mappings F ν : I ⇒ Rn, defined by 18
F ν(i) := F (i)
⋂
]−∞, sν(i) ]
Since F is measurable and closed valued, and we can write ]−∞, sν(i) ] = sν(i)−Rn+ which is as
well measurable and closed valued, the correspondences F ν are measurable and closed valued 19.
Note that ∀ ν ∈ N, s(i) ∈ F ν(i). Defining the closed valued correspondence F : I ⇒ Rn :
F (i) :=
⋂
ν∈N
F ν(i)
we get then that s(i) ∈ F (i). The correspondence F is as well measurable 19.
We now prove that actually F (i) ≡ {s(i)}, which completes the proof. Indeed, suppose that
y ∈ F (i). Then, by definition of F , y ∈ F (i) and y ≤ sν(i), ∀ ν ∈ N. From equality (A.3) we get
that any point in F (i) can be obtained as the limit of a subsequence of {sν(i) : ν ∈ N}, so in the
limit the inequality is maintained, this is ∀ s ∈ F (i), y ≤ s. That is, y is a lower bound for F (i).
This implies, by the definition of infS F (i), that y ≤ infS F (i), but y ∈ F (i), so infS F (i) ≤ y.
Thus, y ≤ s(i) = infS F (i) ≤ y.
Analogous arguments applied to the mapping F¯ : I ⇒ Rn:
F¯ (i) := F (i)
⋂ (⋂
ν∈N
[sν(i) ,+∞ [
)
prove the statement for s¯.

18The interval ]−∞, x ] is the set of points of Rn that are smaller than x ∈ Rn, similarly [x,+∞ [ is the set of
points in Rn that are greater than x.
19See Proposition 14.11 in Rockafellar and Wets (1998)
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B Proof of Proposition 4.9
Proof.
For (i): note that
Γ(a) ≡
∫
I
B(i, a) di ≡
{
P˜ r({a})∫
I
B(i, δa∗) di ≡ R˜({a})
and use Proposition 4.1.
For (ii) from Proposition 4.1 we see that we only need to prove that under condition 4.1:
a∗ is Locally Strongly Point Rational =⇒ a∗ is Locally Strongly Rational.
For a subset X ⊆ A call P(X) := ⋂t≥0 P˜ rt(X) and note that if P(X) ≡ {a∗} then ∀ X ′ ⊆ X,
P(X ′) ≡ {a∗}.
Take V , the neighborhood of the Proposition. For a borel subset X ⊆ V the hypothesis implies
that the integral of i ⇒ B(i,P(X)) is contained in the integral of i ⇒ co {B(i,X)}. From
Aumann (1965) we know that: ∫
I
co {B(i,X)} di ≡
∫
I
B(i,X) di
and so
R˜(X) ≡
∫
I
B(i,P(X)) di ⊆
∫
I
B(i,X) di ≡ P˜ r(X) (B.1)
If a∗ is Locally Strongly Point Rational then there exists a neighborhood V ′ such that P(V ′) =
{a∗}. So now take an open ball of radius ε > 0 around a∗ that is contained in both V and V ′.
To ensure that the process for probability forecasts is well defined, we can take the closed ball of
radius ε/2, B
(
a∗, ε2
)
, that is strictly contained in the previous ball and of course in the intersection
of both neighborhoods. In particular, we have that P
(
B
(
a∗, ε2
)) ≡ {a∗} and that R˜t(B(a∗, ε2)) is
well defined and closed for all t ≥ 1. The last assertion, along with (B.1), imply that for all t ≥ 1
R˜t
(
B
(
a∗, ε2
)) ≡ P˜ rt(B(a∗, ε2)). We conclude that,⋂
t≥0
R˜t
(
B
(
a∗,
ε
2
))
≡ P
(
B
(
a∗,
ε
2
))
≡ {a∗}

C Proof of Proposition 4.11
Proof.
We give the proof for the case where all the agents have the same utility function u : S×A → R.
Consider then a convex neighborhood V of a∗ and the space of probability measures P(V ).
Take a probability measure with finite support, µ, in this space, this is µ =
∑L
l=1 µlδal , with
{al}Ll=1 ⊂ V . For this measure, under the differentiability hypothesis, we can prove that if the
support of µ, {a1, . . . , aL}, is contained in a ball 20 B(a∗, ε1), then
‖ B(µ)−B(Eµ [a])‖ < ε21.
20Since A is compact V is bounded.
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Since Eµ [a] ∈ V we get that B(Eµ [a]) ∈ B(V ). Using a density argument we may conclude that
B(µ) is “close” to B(V ) ⊆ co {B(V )} ≡ P˜ r(V ) for any measure in P(V ). We can take then ε1 > 0
small, related to the neighborhood V , such that,
R˜(V ) ⊂ P˜ r(V ) + B(0, ε21) (C.1)
From the hypothesis we get that we can choose a number k¯ < k′ < 1 such that the following
inclusions hold:
P˜ r(V ) ⊂ Vk¯ ⊂ Vk′ ⊂ V (C.2)
R˜(V ) ⊂ P˜ r(V ) + B(0, ε21) ⊂ Vk′ (C.3)
Moreover, taking the second iterate of R˜ starting at V , using (C.3) and (C.1) on Vk′ ,
R˜2(V ) ⊂P˜ r(Vk′) + B
(
0, ε22
)
where ε2 depends on k′. However it can be chosen in such a way that the following inclusions
hold. Using (C.2) we get
P˜ r(Vk′) + B
(
0, ε22
) ⊂Vk¯k′ + B(0, ε22)
⊂Vk′2 .
We have then,
R˜2(V ) ⊂Vk′2
Using the same argument, choosing εt related to the powers of k′, k′
t−1, we get that for all t,
R˜t(V ) ⊂ P˜ r(Vk′t−1) + B
(
0, ε2t
) ⊂ Vk¯k′t−1 + B(0, ε2t ) ⊂ Vk′t
We conclude then that the eductive process converges to the equilibrium a∗.

D Proof of Proposition 5.5
Proof.
From Propositions 5.4 and 5.3 we get that EΓ is non empty and has a greatest and a smallest
element.
Following the structure of the proof of Theorem 5 in Milgrom and Roberts we prove that P˜ r
t
(A)
is contained in some interval [at, a¯t] and that the sequences at and a¯t satisfy at → infEΓ {EΓ} and
a¯t → supEΓ {EΓ}.
Define a0 and at as:
a0 := inf A (D.1)
at := inf
A
Γ
(
at−1
) ∀ t ≥ 1 (D.2)
• P˜ rt(A) ⊆ [at,+∞[
Clearly it is true for t = 0.
Suppose that it is true for t ≥ 0. That is, at ≤ a ∀ a ∈ P˜ rt(A). Since B(i, · ) is increasing,
we get that B(i, at)  B(i, a) ∀ a ∈ P˜ rt(A). In particular ∀ y ∈ B(i, a) and ∀ a ∈ P˜ rt(A),
we have infS B(i, at) ≤ y. From Lemma A.2, the correspondence i ⇒ infS B(i, at) is
measurable. This implies that for any measurable selection s ∈ SI of i ⇒ B
(
i, P˜ r
t
(A)
)
,∫
inf
S
B
(
i, at
)
di ≤
∫
s(i) di. (D.3)
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Since B(i, at) is subcomplete, infS B(i, at) ∈ B(i, at) and so we get that:
inf
A
Γ
(
at
) ≡ inf
A
{
b ∈ A : ∃ s measurable selection of i ⇒ B(i, at) such that, b = A(s)}
≤
∫
inf
S
B
(
i, at
)
(D.4)
We conclude then that
at+1 ≡ inf
A
Γ
(
at
) ≤ ∫ inf
S
B
(
i, at
) ≤ a ∀ a ∈ P˜ rt+1(A) .
The equality is the definition of at+1, the first inequality comes from (D.4) and the second
one is obtained from (D.3) and the definition of P˜ r.
• The sequence is increasing:
By definition of a0, a0 ≤ a1. Suppose that at−1 ≤ at, then from Lemma 2.4.2 in Topkis
(1998), at ≡ infA Γ
(
at−1
) ≤ infA Γ(at) ≡ at+1.
• The sequence has a limit and limt→+∞ at is a fixed point of Γ:
Since the sequence is increasing and A is a complete lattice, it has a limit a∗. Furthermore,
since Γ is subcomplete, upper semi-continuity of Γ implies that a∗ ∈ Γ(a∗).
• a∗ ≡ infEΓ {EΓ}:
According to the previous demonstration, since the fixed points of Γ are in the set PA, all
fixed points must be in [a∗,+∞[ and so a∗ is the smallest fixed point.
Defining a¯0 and a¯t as:
a¯0 := supA (D.5)
a¯t := sup
A
Γ
(
a¯t−1
) ∀ t ≥ 1 (D.6)
In an analogous way we obtain that PA ⊆ ]−∞, a¯∗ ], with a¯∗ being the greatest fixed point of Γ.

E Proof of Proposition 5.15
Proof.
Following the proof of Proposition 5.5, consider the sequence {at}∞t=0 therein defined, but let
us change the definition of at when t is odd to:
at := sup
A
Γ
(
at−1
)
.
By the definition of a0, we know that ∀ a ∈ A, a ≥ a0. Since the mappings B(i, · ) are decreasing
we have B
(
i, a0
)  B(i, a) ∀ a ∈ A and in particular
sup
S
B
(
i, a0
) ≥ y ∀ y ∈ B(i, a) ∀ a ∈ A
Since B
(
i, a0
)
is subcomplete supS B
(
i, a0
) ∈ B(i, a0) and from Lemma A.2 the function i →
supS B
(
i, a0
)
is measurable, so
∫
supS B
(
i, a0
) ∈ Γ(a0), thus
sup
A
Γ
(
a0
) ≥ ∫ sup
S
B
(
i, a0
)
di ≥
∫
s(i) di
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for any measurable selection s of i ⇒ B(i,A). That is a1 ≥ a ∀ a ∈ P˜ r1(A); or equivalently,
P˜ r
1
(A) ⊆ ]−∞, a1 ] .
A similar argument leads to conclude that P˜ r
2
(A) ⊆ [a2,+∞[.
Let us define then the sequence bt := a2t, t ≥ 0. This sequence satisfies:
1. P˜ r
2t ⊆ [bt,+∞[. This can be obtained as above by induction over t.
2.
{
bt
}
t≥0 is increasing.
As before, we get that
{
bt
}
t≥0 has a limit b
∗. Since Γ is u.s.c. and A is compact, we obtain
that the second iterate of Γ, Γ2 is as well u.s.c.. Moreover, from Proposition 5.13, we get that
bt ∈ Γ2(bt−1). This implies that b∗ is a fixed point of Γ2 and so it is a point-rationalizable state.
Consequently we get
1. PA ⊆ [b∗,+∞ [
2. b∗ ∈ Γ2(b∗) and b∗ is a point-rationalizable state.
Considering the analogous sequence to obtain the upper bound for PA:
a¯0 := supA
a¯t := inf
A
Γ
(
a¯t−1
)
when t is odd (E.1)
a¯t := sup
A
Γ
(
a¯t−1
)
when t is even
We generate a decreasing sequence
{
b¯t
}
t≥0 defined by b¯
t := a¯2t, t ≥ 0, who’s limit b¯∗, is a
point-rationalizable state and an upper bound for PA, that is:
1. PA ⊆
]−∞, b¯∗ ]
2. b¯∗ ∈ Γ2(b¯∗). Which implies that b¯∗ is a point-rationalizable state.
As a summary, we get:
PA ⊆
⋂
t≥0
P˜ r
t
(A) ⊆
⋂
t≥0
P˜ r
2t
(A) ⊆ [b∗, b¯∗] (E.2)

28
